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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CPLR 3041: A demand in a bill of particulars for identification of
witnesses is permissible under special circumstances.
Generally, the purposes of a bill of particulars are amplification of
the pleading, prevention of surprise at trial, and limitation of the
scope of proof.92 The bill was not intended as a means of eliciting evi-
dence or obtaining the names of witnesses.93 However, courts will
allow a demand for such information under special circumstances. 94
Such circumstances were found in Block v. Fairbairn,9 5 where the
plaintiff, a dog-bite victim, was required to furnish the identity of
persons who were with him at the time of the incident. 98 In so holding,
the Supreme Court, Ulster County, advocated the expansion of the
scope of the bill of particulars as a means of reducing the expense of
litigation, citing the increasing cost of the record of examinations
before trial, the usual device by which such information is obtained.
It has been argued that the bill of particulars "imposes burdens
on the parties and the court that far outweigh the modicum of added
intelligence that may be afforded by [its] use... ."97 Nevertheless, the
idea that the scope of the bill of particulars should be expanded in this
regard certainly has merit. It mirrors a welcome judicial inclination
toward making the courts more accessible to many litigants for whom
the cost of the record of an examination before trial would otherwise
be prohibitive.
CPLR 3042: Attorney personally fined for ignoring a demand for a
bill of particulars.
Blanchfield Storage, Inc. v. State98 involved a motion to vacate a
conditional preclusion order which had been granted to the State after
Corp. v. Vanderbilt, 44 Misc. 2d 542, 254 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964).
Therein, the court held that a complaint demanding injunctive relief would not be dis-
missed for defective verification where the defendant would not be substantially preju-
diced if the defect were ignored.
92 Elman v. Ziegfeld, 200 App. Div. 494, 193 N.Y.S. 133 (1st Dep't 1922).
93W. R. Simmons & Assocs. Research, Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 37 Misc. 2d
62, 234 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962); Slawson v. Murphy, 37 N.Y.S.2d 930
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1942). See generally 6 CARMODY-WArr 2d § 36:3 (1968).
94 H. WACHTELL, NEw YoRK PRACcF UNDER THE CPLR 230-31 (3d ed. 1970). See In re
Cohn's Estate, 41 Misc. 2d 36, 244 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1963).
05 68 Misc. 2d 931, 328 N.Y.S2d 497 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1972).
90 The court also allowed, inter alia, the defendant's demand for information as to
whether the dog was claimed to have bitten anyone in the past, stating that it "would
prevent surprise at the trial and would permit the defendants to investigate such claim
prior to trial." Id. at 933, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 500. Three other dog-bite cases have
similarly permitted the use of the device for the identification of previous victims. Diskin
v. St. Martin's Roman Catholic Church, 2 App. Div. 2d 901, 157 N.Y.S.2d 144 (2d Dep't
1956); Drake v. Hess, 281 App. Div. 1074, 122 N.Y.S.2d 32 (4th Dep't 1953) (per curiam);
Robson v. Driscoll, 278 App. Div. 847, 104 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dep't 1951).
97 3 WK&M 3041.05.
98 69 Misc. 2d 487, 330 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (mem.).
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the claimant in an appropriation proceeding had ignored a demand
by the State for a bill of particulars. In the exercise of its discretion,
the court granted the claimant's motion to vacate the order, on condi-
tion that the attorney personally remit one hundred dollars to the State.
It took this course "in order to point up [its] aversion to claimant's
counsel's lack of attention to his responsibilities .. and . . . to dis-
courage such neglectful conduct in the future."99
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
CPLR 3101: Liberalization of disclosure in matrimonial actions.
In Lachoff v. Lachoff,1° ° the Supreme Court, Nassau County,
granted the defendant-husband's motion for disclosure proceedings
against his plaintiff-wife. While the policy has been to deny disclosure
in matrimonial actions, on the theory that such examination may
impede or prevent reconciliation,' 0 ' the court reasoned that the 1967
revisions of the DRL 10 2 requiring the parties to go through a concili-
ation procedure at the outset of matrimonial actions made this theory
obsolete. 103 The court abandoned the rule which allowed pretrial dis-
closure in matrimonial actions only upon a showing of "special cir-
cumstances," and followed'0 4 the liberal approach 05 which permits
such disclosure unless the opposing party is able to show circumstances
which would render it improper 0 6
Lachoff goes beyond Hochberg v. Hochberg,07 which allowed dis-
closure of financial matters in matrimonial actions. The instant deci-
sion is a positive step toward granting parties in matrimonial actions
the same rights as those in other actions.
09 Id. at 491, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 143, citing Maglieri v. Saks, 33 App. Div. 2d 898, 306
N.YS.2d 479 (1st Dep't 1970); Breazeal v. Rent-A-Car Club of America, 32 App. Div. 2d
653, 300 N.Y.S.2d 812 (2d Dep't 1969); Boyle v. Krebs & Schulz Motors, Inc., 18 App. Div.
2d 1010, 239 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2d Dep't 1963); 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3042, supp. commentary
at 269-70 (1970).
1o 69 Misc. 2d 512, 330 N.YS.2d 227 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (mem.).
101 See 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3101, commentary at 18-19 (1970).
102 DRL 215. See Hunter v. Hunter, 10 App. Div. 2d 291, 198 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Ist
Dep't 1960).
103 69 Misc. 2d at 512, 330 N.YS.2d at 229.
104Id., 330 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
205 See Plancher v. Plancher, 35 App. Div. 2d 417, 317 N.Y.S.2d 140 (2d Dep't 1970),
aff'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 880, 278 NXE.2d 650, 328 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1972); Dunlap v. Dunlap,
34 App. Div. 2d 889, 312 N.Y.S.2d 441 (4th Dep't 1970) (mem.) (disclosure of all relevant
matters); Campbell v. Campbell, 7 App. Div. 2d 1011, 184 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dep't 1957).
106 CPLR 3101(b).
107 63 Misc. 2d 77, 310 N.YS.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 342, 356 (1970).
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